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EQUALITY AND INEQUALITY
IN RELATION TO JUSTICE
Giorgio Del Vecchio*

1. WHEN ONE BEGINS to reflect on the idea of justice in order to discover its
essence, the idea of equality immediately springs to mind. Pythagoras, the
oldest philosopher to enquire into this problem, defined justice as equality.
This equality should manifest itself concretely in the return of like for like.
But it is easy to understand the inadequacy of this definition, an inadequacy
which in fact was already realized in antiquity. It is well known that
Aristotle, although starting out from the Pythagorean theory, introduced an
important distinction. He taught that there is one type of justice which applies
especially to contracts, and requires an equivalence in the obligations assumed by the contracting parties. But there is also another type of justice,
distributive justice, which takes into consideration the "dignity" or merit of
the persons concerned, and necessitates that each be treated differently, in
proportion and corresponding to these merits (Kar'q-quv).
This doctrine became classic, and is still considered fundamental. Nevertheless there are various objections that can be raised to it. As far as contractual relations are concerned, i.e., the area of so-called commutative justice,
the law in actual fact does not, and cannot, insist that there be an objective
parity in the value of the goods exchanged (except in the special case of laesio
enormis). It can only insist that there be subjective liberty of consent. As for
distributive justice, it is to be noted that Aristotle left indeterminate the criterion for evaluating "dignity" or personal merit. He lacked the concept of
the essential value of the human person, the recognition of which must be the
first postulate of justice. This lack is clearly seen in his justification of the
institution of slavery.
2. A great advance took place in the conception of justice when this ideal
postulate, already glimpsed by the Stoics, was loftily affirmed by Christianity.
According to the Gospel, all men, being children of God, are brothers. The
same spirit exists in all, and the law of charity is universally valid for all. From
this universal law arises the categorical obligation of respect for that which
* Translated by THOMAS TAYLOR.
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is sacred in each human being; and from this law, too, comes the natural
right to demand such respect. Positive legislation ought to have conformed
to the law of love in the past, just as it ought to do so now. But though sometimes proclaimed in solemn formulas, the law of love has been accepted very
imperfectly in positive law, when not ignored altogether.
The law inherent in human nature itself has also been demonstrated by
rational analysis, independent of theological premises. Thus the dictates of
reason and those of faith have been shown in a general way to converge. In
spite of the opposition of a few schools, this innate law has been often and
sometimes imperiously invoked by the common conscience; it has found expression in the constitutions of the more civilized peoples of the world, and
in recent international documents. The specific character of this fundamental law has also been indicated in diverse ways. But if we compare such
general declarations with the legislative systems actually in force, including
those prefaced by solemn declarations of principle, we realize that the principles have suffered grave distortions and restrictions, partly inevitable, partly
unjustified.
The recognition of the juridical personality of each human being, without
any exception whatsoever, in such a way as to assure the fundamental equality
of each individual, one to another, is a principle that we must retain as
absolutely valid. Understood and applied rationally, this principle should
be the basis of a societas humani generis, such that humanity forms a single
state. There are sound reasons for believing that, in spite of the conflicts still
raging, the history of mankind is in fact making its way towards this goal.
But so long as divers states exist, how can the distinction between citizens
and foreigners be abolished? They can be considered equal only (and in
fact this is admitted by the more advanced states) as far as civil rights are
concerned, but not in political rights.
There must be no exclusion based on differences of race or religious beliefs, as to either civil or political rights. This is clearly affirmed, for example
by Article Three of the Constitution of Italy. But everyone knows that in

some states perfect juridical equality for all citizens, whatever their faith
or race, has not yet been achieved. In fact, the complete refusal to recognize
this principle has sometimes led to vile and infamous persecutions which
have made every just conscience shudder.
3. In general, the juridical equality of the two sexes must also be admitted. This, too, has been affirmed by the Italian Constitution." But in
reality no positive legislation attributes absolutely identical rights and duties
to the two sexes, for obvious reasons. Conscription, for example, is usually
I Constitution of Italy, arts. 3 and 51.
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obligatory only for men. Women are also excluded by law in the various
states from those functions for which they are considered less suitable. Even
in certain highly civilized states like Switzerland, women are denied the right
to vote. This is certainly in contrast, not only with the principle of the juridical
equality of the two sexes, but also with that of universal suffrage. The doninant trend today, however, is rightly towards a gradual rectification of the
old system which kept women in a form of subjection. There is a tendency,
in short, to move as close as possible to real equality, except in those cases
where the determining factor is not a lesser esteem, but rather the respect
owing the very nature of womanhood. It is well to remember, as to this
question, that in modem labor legislation the sacred function of motherhood
is particularly safeguarded; even prison regulations in some countries take
this into consideration. On the other hand, the admission of women to public
office is always dependent on their having the necessary qualifications.
The abstract principle of the equality of the two sexes gives rise to special
problems regarding the structure of the family. It is evident that if this
principle is rigidly followed, it would take away from the man his status as
head of the family.2 As a result, it would be difficult to maintain that unity
which is the essential element of the institution of the family. This does not
necessarily mean, however, that the rights of women cannot also be broadened
in this field, without going so far as an absolute levelling. Various reforms
have been proposed in this sense, some of which are plausible enough, while
others deserve to be treated with some reserve.
It has been proposed, among other things, to make the penal sanctions
for adultery equal for the two sexes, even though the possible consequences
of such actions are naturally different. In my opinion, the fairest solution
of this problem would be the abolition of this type of offense, leaving it
within the competence of the magistrate, acting on the complaint of one of
the spouses, and taking into account all the circumstances, to judge whether
injury was done in any particular case. The legal definition of this offense
(which is perhaps too restricted) could be suitably modified. 3 But this is an

argument which merits more profound study. I merely cite it here as one
example of possible inequality.
4. The dignity of the human being is substantially equal in all phases of
his life. But his real capacities vary considerably, and it would be unreason-

able not to take this into account through a false application of the concept
of equality. All juridical systems define the age at which the subject attains
his majority, that is, the age at which one enjoys full civil rights. But this
2 CODICE CIVILE, art. 144 (Italy, 1964).
3 COnIC, PENALE, art. 594 (Italy, 1964).
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definition is insufficient; there are other norms which lay down various age
limits for both private and public rights. Taking Italian legislation as a case
in point, we see that while the subject reaches his majority on his twenty-first
birthday, anyone who has reached his eighteenth birthday may make a valid
will, may take employment and may stipulate the conditions under which he
assumes this employment in a valid contract. 4 In penal law, anyone who has
not reached his fourteenth birthday at the moment in which the offense was
committed cannot be charged; while anyone who has passed his fourteenth
5
year but not yet reached his eighteenth birthday is given a shorter sentence.
Various distinctions in terms of age are also made concerning the right to
vote and eligibility for the two branches of Parliament. These examples, to
which others could be added, are sufficient to illustrate the difficulty of drawing up a coherent set of regulations covering this whole field. Certainly the
series of separate measures taken without any regard for the problem as a
whole has not provided a satisfactory solution.
We must confess, thinking of the incalculable number of future cases, that
positive law can never adequately meet the changing realities of a situation
continuously in flux. Legal definitions, even when they leave a certain margin
of discretion to the judges, have always something of the mechanical about
them, and reflect only imperfectly the realities of individual cases. It is evident
that the natural capacities of individuals subject to the same laws are very
different. Yet it is equally evident that it would be practically impossible to
subject everyone to an examination to ascertain whether or not each single
individual has attained a certain level of competence, just as it would be
impossible to have the limits of the terms of prescription depend on a judgment
based on one particular set of circumstances.
It is helpful, however, to note that the Roman jurists, as well as modern
legislators, have known how to concede a certain limited validity to acts and
relationships which do not conform to the general laws regulating these acts
and relationships. A case in point is the distinction between absolute and
relative nullity. The juridical acts of those who, though they be minors, are
naturally competent, are not absolutely null and void, as are those of the
insane, but can be rendered valid by ratification and guaranty.6
5. In modern civilized states, as a result of philosophy and some historic
revolutions, the concept has long been established that the citizens have the
obligation to obey the law; but they also have the right to participate in the
formulation of this law by their vote, either through their representatives, or
arts. 2, 3, 591.
arts. 97, 98; d. arts. 223-227.
CrVILE, arts. 1444, 1939.
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directly. The principle has also been firmly established that the government
and the other organs of public administration are themselves subject to law;
and it must always be possible for citizens, in cases of transgression, to have
recourse to the courts, whose independence must be assured.
These concepts correspond to the fundamental principle of the dignity
and liberty of the human being, and as such are to be considered as unshakable. But their application gives rise to not a few problems. Participation,
however indirect, in the legislative power requires, by its very nature, a degree
of competence superior to that necessary for the exercise of private rights.
Political competence must be logically distinguished from civil competence.
This distinction is clearly sanctioned by positive law, since the latter is attributed even to foreigners, the former only to citizens. But besides this, legislative systems usually lay down certain more or less rigorous requisites for the
attribution of political competence to citizens. For example, until a few
decades ago Italian legislation required as a condition of political competence
the ability to read and write. But the legislation now in force gives the right
to vote even to the illiterate at the age of civil competence, i.e., twenty-one
years.
The consequences of this equalization are important; for in spite of the
efforts made to combat illiteracy and diffuse culture in general, the number of
illiterate people, especially in certain regions, is still significant, and more so
those who are semi-illiterate. No one would seriously maintain that those in
either of these categories are really qualified to direct the policies of the state.
There is another fact that must be considered in this respect: the formation of political parties, some of which are strongly organized and subject to
rigid discipline. This has happened in Italy just as it has in other countries.
The pressure that they exert on the organs of the state has often disturbed
their proper functioning. One of these parties, which draws its inspiration
from dialectic materialism and is guided by directives from abroad, has for
its platform the overthrow of the priesent social and juridical order, in order
to install the working class as the dominant class in the state, to the detriment
of the other classes and of individual rights. As is well known, this party has
been outlawed in some states; but not in Italy, where it has spread its influence
over the less cultured part of the nation, where the herd instinct is stronger
than the sense of individuality. This situation, which is not without its dangers,
has naturally given rise to all sorts of discussion and proposals. The principle
of universal suffrage has even been called into question, as being the source
of the present difficulties in the political life of the nation.
In my opinion, however, this principle must be maintained. But it should
be applied more rationally, taking into account the different capacities of
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people according to their culture and age; this would not be to create privilege, but would reflect purely objective criteria of a general character.
This is an area in which for true justice some criterion having regard for real
values should be adopted in place of a mechanical concept of equality. Let
us bear in mind the Aristotelian maxim: to treat unequal merits equally
mean's to contradict the very idea of equality itself, and to violate distributive
justice.
One system which would meet the need is the following: out of the total
number of representatives to be elected, a certain percentage (say forty percent) should be elected by those citizens who have reached a certain level in
school (junior high school, for example) ; the majority of the remaining sixty
percent should be elected by those persons who have reached a certain age
(for example, thirty or thirty-five), while the minority of this sixty percent
should be elected by those who have not yet attained this age. It is understood, of course, that these figures are purely indicative, and may be substituted by others based on statistical analysis of these social categories, in such
a way, however, that of these three categories a proportionately greater weight
is attributed to the first than to the second, and to the second greater weight
than to the third. But those elected in this fashion should all have equal
status, so that the representative assembly be perfectly homogeneous.
6. The aims of the United Nations undoubtedly make it one of the
noblest institutions of mankind, and it has developed definite activities for
the progress of civilization and the peace of the world. But it is impossible
to ignore certain defects in its structure and procedure. While its Statute
declares the equality of all member nations, it grants important privileges
to five states as permanent members of the Security Council, placing the others
in a condition of serious and permanent inferiority. Moreover, while the supreme end of this organization (as set out also in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of December 10, 1948) is the defense of the natural rights of
the human person, states have been admitted to its membership which do not
respect these rights, either in their own internal legislation or in their international relations; even certain of the privileged states are in this position.
These defects have become more and more serious, because in the last
few years numerous states with very limited cultures, indeed, have become
members of the United Nations. They include states which lack the juridical
structure necessary to guarantee the fundamental rights. These states have
been granted juridical equality with constitutional states, some of which are
among the most highly civilized in the world. This creates the danger that
the vote of the nonconstitutional states can paralyze the action of the others,
and even of the United Nations itself. Here we have an equality which
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implies a refusal to recognize essential values, an equality thus contrary to
justice.
A radical reform in the sense of admitting to membership in the United
Nations only legitimate states, i.e., states based on "the rule of law," does not
seem to be in the realm of practical possibility for the moment. Such a
measure, moreover, should in theory be retroactive in its application. It
can only be hoped that henceforth deliberations on the admission of new
members be carried on with a just rigor, with insistence on this requisite.
A reform which would at least partly eliminate the inconveniences and
the dangers of the present state of affairs, and assure a fairer and more
rational functioning of the United Nations, would be to distinguish between states based on "the rule of law" (or on "the rule of justice") and
states which are not, even though, it is to be hoped, they may become so at
some future date. Only the former should have the privilege of voting in
the debates of the Assembly, at least on the most important matters. In
place of a blind levelling, this system would give due and reasonable consideration to the various degrees of competence of each individual member
of the organization. But we must not delude ourselves with the probability
that even such a limited reform could easily be realized under the present
circumstances.
Another problem which has been given little attention is the question
as to whether it is just in international organizations to attributc equal validity
to the vote of all states, both large and small, or whether the size of their
respective populations should be taken into consideration. The first alternative conforms to the concept of the juridical equality of states, all being equally
sovereign. But the Benthamic maxim that "each must count as one" is
also applicable to individuals; and it does not seem plausible that a vote
expressing the will of a few thousand men should have the same weight as
that expressing the will of many millions of people. To conciliate these
opposing demands, a system might be adopted which recognized both: for
a vote to be valid, a majority according to both the first and the'second
criterion would be necessary.
7. The principle of the dignity of the human being is generally recognized and applied, though not always exactly, by the juridical systems of
the more advanced peoples, and their various institutions. But there is a
sector of these systems in which the principle is, in my opinion, completely
unknown, and that is the area of penal law. Even the most modem systems
feel the influence of extremely ancient prejudices in this field. For this reason
it is considered just to meet evil with evil, and the suffering inflicted on the
perpetrator of a criminal act is considered "reparation."
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The truth is, that evil can only be compensated for by good. If the
proverb "An eye for an eye, a tooth for tooth" has been repudiated in its
crudest form by the conscience of civilized nations, and one no longer cuts
off the hand of a thief or tears out the tongue of a slandermonger, yet the
false idea still obtains that the evil of a criminal action must be met with a
corresponding evil in its punishment.
But does the desire to cause pain to a human being, even though he be
guilty, mean that his personality is respected? Or is this not a sort of duplication of the wrong done, and, as Plato has observed, ethically unjustifiable? 7
Is it just for a human being to be denied the possibility of developing his own
spiritual and intellectual powers, and of communicating with his fellow man
over long periods of time, even for life? And is it just that such punishment
be the motive for grief and serious damage, not only to the culprit, but also
to his innocent family?
Certainly, judicial sanctions are necessary against offenders. But here is
the crux of the whole problem: what should the nature of these sanctions be,
if one is to be guided by the ideal of justice? One thing is absolutely clear
in my opinion: -neither the death penalty, nor prisons, nor any of the existing
types of corrective institutions correspond to this ideal. We can leave aside
as extraneous to the issue in question the universally admitted principle of
"legitimate defense," as having its reasons and its limitations precisely in its
purpose of defense. This also applies to so-called "security measures," which
are not intended to punish, but to prevent offenses, and are also applied to
the mentally ill, obviously with no intent to cause suffering.
According to the profound maxim of Seneca, which has been echoed by
other thinkers, crime is in itself its own worst punishment.8 A feeling of
remorse and repentance normally arises in the heart of the offender after
having committed an offense (at least in the vast majority of cases). This
in substance already constitutes a punishment. It may be added that, apart
from any penal action, wicked actions usually provoke the reprobation of
society and bring discredit on their perpetrators, with results that cannot
leave them indifferent.
It still remains to determine the proper field of action for an authentic
penal justice. Its foundation is the rational demand that the offender, as
far as it is within his power, be made to make restitution for the damage
caused by his crime, bearing in mind that the damage ex delicto does not
I PLATO,

CaiTo X, 49c v; also

THE REPUBLIC 1, 9, 335d. Cf. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,

SUMMA THEOLOOLE 2a-2ae, 108, 1.
s "Prima et maxima Peccantium est poena, peccasse; nec ullum scelus impunitum esi:

quoniam sceleris, in scelere, supplicium est." SENECA, EPIsT. AD LuCILIUM XCVII.
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merely concern the immediate victims of the crime, but also public order
in general, i.e., society as a whole. The provisions of the law actually in force
in this field are riddled with defects. Admittedly, they do affirm the obligation of restitution and compensation as one of the consequences of criminal
action, but only in respect to the individual persons who have suffered damage, and not as to the public order. This affirmation, moreover, remains
almost always a dead letter because of the insolvency of thc guilty, whose
very conviction makes it impossible for them to work, and hence to pay
damages. Nor is there any provision for estimating the damage done to the
public order that has been disturbed, while penal sanctions of a pecuniary
nature, such as fines, are fixed at a completely arbitrary figure. Let us admit
that it is not particularly easy to assess damages; but at least the principle, and
certain objective criteria, should be laid down by law as guidelines for determining the damages to be paid.
In order to render effective, and not merely nominal, the obligation of
restitution, those guilty of an offense should be forced, in my opinion, to take
a job, the earnings from which would go to pay the debt incurred. If this
work is voluntarily and conscientiously done, it should be carried on in
liberty, and its nature should be in conformity with the aptitudes of each
person concerned. The work should, however, be under the tutelage of a
special magistrate with the power to order the offender in more serious cases,
or in the case of nonfulfillment of the conditions prescribed, to take any
job that the court sees fit, with certain concomitant restrictions of liberty
to be laid down by law, though always in a humane and civilized form. To
this court, or to some organization directly dependent on it, could be confided the responsibility of supervising the lives of those who had not yet
fully met their debt incurred ex delicto, and this court would have the responsibility of at least eliminating the more serious offenses against good faith
and morality. All this would be done with respect for the fundamental rights
of the human person.
This proposal touches on problems that are- both arduous and complex,
and will surely give rise to all sorts of doubts and objections, particularly
since it diverges from opinions current today and from the juridical systems
in force. There is no possibility that such a proposal, even though it met
with some approval, be immediately put into effect. Nevertheless, it is not
entirely beyond the bounds of possibility that it be gradually realized over
a period of time. Some of the innovations that have recently been introduced
into various penal systems show a trend towards correcting their more outstanding defects, although they do not go so far as to introduce those radical
reforms which in my opinion are eminently desirable. Some examples in this
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sense spring to mind, such as the adoption of the suspcnded sentence, 9 the
so-called "judicial pardon" for minors under eighteen years of age, 10 and
the establishment of trade schools and agricultural colonies for the reeducation
of delinquents.
8. In our search for solutions of the various problems of social life that
would draw their inspiration from the ideal of justice, we have seen that
the concept of equality does have a certain function, particularly insofar as
it leads to the recognition of the essential dignity of the human person. But
the concept is not sufficient to solve these problems. Justice demands that once
this fundamental equality be admitted, then differences based on the capacities
and behavior of individuals be taken into consideration.
Even the most just laws are often difficult to put into practice, not only
because of transgressions, but because of the insufficiency of the means necessary for their application. For example, the Italian Constitution declares that
"at least eight years of schooling is both obligatory and free for all,""
but the number of existing schools is inferior to the need, and the economic
situation of some families makes it impossible for them to meet this obligation.
Another norm of the Constitution affirms that everyone, "even those without
means, has the right to legal assistance in any court in the land."' 2 Though
free legal assistance is available to meet this provision, especially for the
purpose of assuring the poor an adequate defense in criminal trials, it is
notorious that this defense is often nothing more than a mere formality, and
certainly much less effective than that which people who are well off can
produce for themselves. Laws must be of a general character, and not refer
to individuals, as Ulpian has already warned us ("Jura non in singulas
personas, sed generaliter constituuntur"),13 Laws that condemn certain
persons (e.g., ex-royalty and their families) to exile without due process of
law, i.e., without at least having the possibility of defending themselves, cannot
be considered as just. Since the punishment of exile is not contemplated in the
penal systems in force at present, such laws stand in evident contradiction to
the reasonable provision (also accepted in the Italian Constitution) that
"no one may be punished except on the basis of a law already in force before
4
the offense was committed."'
For laws to be of a really general character, it is not sufficient that
they be drawn up with one group of people in mind, no matter how numerous.
9 CODICE PENALE, art. 163.
10 Ibid., art. 169.
22 Constitution of Italy, art. 34.
12 Ibid., art. 24.
Is DIGEST 1. 3. 8.
14

Constitution of Italy, art. 25.
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They must rather have in mind everyone who belongs to the same category
to which this particular group belongs. Take the case, for example, of
amnesties and pardons, which are granted at irregular intervals on special
occasions to certain categories of prisoners, all the rest being excluded. Let
us admit that in spite of such partiality, this practice serves to mitigate the
excessive cruelty of our present penal systems. We can even consider such
irregular measures as an index, indeed almost:as a confession, of the defects
in these systems. But it would certainly be more just, without having to wait
for the radical reform that we proposed above, or any other legislative reforms for that matter, if there were periodic revisions of the sentences of all
those deprived of their personal liberty, for the purpose of granting pardons
to those prisoners whose behavior and situation really warranted them. Along
with this, acts of grace on the part of heads of states could be put on a more
rational basis. The humanitarian character of such gestures forbids that they
should be abolished, but they should be organically inserted in wider and more
just legislation covering the whole of this field.
9. After all these considerations, we are in a position to ask ourselves
just what is meant by the constantly repeated formulas: "The law is equal
for all" and "All citizens are equal before the law." It is evident that if
these sayings are taken literally, especially the first, they would lead to the most
absurd consequences, as though both innocent and guilty should meet with
the same treatment, or children and adults. But their real meaning is that
no one in the state is above the law, no one is legibus solutus; and that the
ancient privileges such as hereditary nobility have been abolished, all citizens
must now be considered as being at the same level. The value of these
formulas is rather limited, for they refer to the laws in general, and laws
may be unjust. Yet even unjust laws have a general application.
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